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THE CONCEPT OF "BREAKING" IN
ANNOUNCEMENT STATUTES
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone,
"it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so
many things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be masterthat's all."1

American breaking and entering statutes codify the common law rule
that police may break into a home for the purpose of arrest or search
only after they have announced their presence and purpose in seeking

entry.2

In spite of the widespread enactment of such statutes, the

1. L. CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass, in CoMPLETE WORKS OF LEVes CARROLL 214 (1936) (emphasis added).
2. The common law thus merged the two inconsistent maxims that everyman's home
is his castle and the king's keys unlock all doors. Wilgus, Arrest Without A Warrant, 22 MICH. L. Rav. 798, 800 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Wilgus]. From the first,
it would seem the king received the better bargain-his keys could unlock the doors of
everyman's castle provided only that the king's agents gave notice of their presence
and purpose:
In all cases where the king is a party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may
break the party's house, either to arrest him, or do other execution of the king's
process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify
the cause of his coming and to make request to open the door.
Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
The influence of the common law upon contemporary American announcement statutes may be seen by comparing the rule in Semayne's Case with the federal announcement statute, one which is typical of the American statutes:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any
part of a house, or anything therein to execute a search warrant, if, after notice
of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970).
3. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 155 (1959); ALAS. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 12.25.150 (1972);
ARIZ. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-414 (1964); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1972); C.Z. CODE tit. 6,§ 3741 (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
901.19(1) (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE § 19-611 (1948); IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1009
(Bums 1956); IowA CODE ANN.§ 755.9 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1819 (1964);
KY. REV. STAT. § 70.078 (1971); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 224 (West 1967);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.880 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.34 (1947); Miss. CODE
CRIM. PRO. tit. 99, § 99-3-11 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.200 (1953); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 29-411 (1965); NEv. REv. STAT. § 171.275 (1967); N.Y. CODE CalM. PRO.
§ 120.80(4) (McKinney 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-44 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 29-06-14 (1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit.
29, § 2935.12 (Page Supp. 1972);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 194 (1969); ORE. REv. STAT. tit. 14, § 133.290 (1971);

1974]

BREAKING

actual definition of the term "breaking" has not been conclusively litigated. 4 This Comment will explore the definitions of "breaking"
which courts have given in the four situations in which the issue has

most commonly arisen: passkey entry, entry through a closed but unlocked door, entry through an open door, and ruse entry.5 These
situations will be analysed in view of the three policy considerations 6
thought to be safeguarded by breaking and entering statutes: preservation of individual privacy, 7 the prevention of needless property destrucS.C. CODE ANN. tit. 53, § 53-198 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. tit. 23, § 15-14

(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 40, § 807 (1955); TEx. CODE CalM. PRO. ANN. art.
18.18 (Vernon 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 77, § 13-12 (1953); V.1. CODE ANN.
§ 3566 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.040 (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7165 (1959).
All of these are substantially similar to the federal rule codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3109
(1971), the text of which is set out in note 2 supra.
4. The United States Supreme Court has not definitively determined the extent to
which announcement statutes codify constitutional requirements. See note 14 infra.
Therefore each jurisdiction has been bound by no authoritative definition of a breaking and has been free to adopt its own.
5. There is no question that entry gained by physical violence comes within the definition of "breaking." See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 303-04 (1958)
(police breaking chain lock was in violation of announcement requirement); United
States v. Likas, 448 F.2d 607, 609 (7th Cir. 1971) (evidence properly suppressed when
agents broke down apartment door with sledge hammer); Accarino v. United States,
179 F.2d 456, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (evidence obtained by breaking down door must
be suppressed); Commonwealth v. Newman, 240 A.2d 795, 799 (Pa. 1968) (breaking
through defendant's door with a sledge hammer violative not only of announcement
statute but fourth amendment as well).
6. In Duke v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 314, 321, 461 P.2d 628, 632-33, 82 Cal. Rptr.
348, 352-53 (1970), Justice Tobriner saw the purposes and policies underlying California's breaking and entering statute, Penal Code § 844, as fourfold: (1) the protection
of the privacy of the individual in his home; (2) the protection of innocent persons
who may also be present on the premises where an arrest is made; (3) the prevention
of situations which are conducive to violent confrontations between the occupant and
individuals who enter his home without proper notice; and (4) the protection of police
who might be injured by a startled and fearful householder.
Justice Marshall in Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968), gleaned
from the decision in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), that there are two
underlying purposes: (1) "the reverence of the law for the individual's right to privacy
in his house" and (2) "to safeguard officers, who might be mistaken, upon an unannounced intrusion into a home, for someone with no right to be there."
This Comment, however, will use the three fold analysis provided in Comment, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 140-42 (1970). This division consists of three purposes: decreasing the potential for violence, the protection of privacy,
and the prevention of the physical destruction of property.
7. Justice Brennan chose to emphasize the privacy aspect of the rule in Miller v.
United States:
The requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into
a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application. Congress, codifying a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law, has
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tion,8 and the avoidance of violent confrontations. 9

I. PASSKEY

ENTRY

The first of the four classes of entry has proven the least controversial. Although entry by means of a passkey does not itself involve
the use of force, there is clearly an invasion of privacy and a danger of
violent confrontation when unannounced policemen silently and swiftly
enter a room with a key. The United States Supreme Court assumed
0
In holding that
such an entry was a breaking in Ker v. California."
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution" did not
require that the prevailing standards developed under the federal statute1 2 be employed to judge a police entry under California's announcement statute'" (and thus leaving unclear the extent to which
announcement statutes codify constitutional requirements 4 ), the Court
declared in § 3109 the reverence of the law for the individual's right of privacy in
his house. Every householder, the good and the bad, the guilty and the innocent, is entitled to the protection designed to secure the common interest against
unlawful invasion of the house.
357 U.S. at 313 (footnote omitted).
8. Comment, The New No-Knock Provision and Its Effect on the Authority of the
Police to Break and Enter, 20 AM. U.L. REv. 467, 469 (1971); Comment, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 142 n.14 (1970).
9. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 n.12 (1958); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 460 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); Duke v. Superior Court,
1 Cal. 3d 314, 321, 461 P.2d 628, 632-33, 82 Cal. Rptr. 348, 352-54 (1969); Greven
v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 287, 292-93, 455 P.2d 432, 435-36, 73 Cal. Rptr. 481,
484-85 (1969); People v. Rosales, 68 Cal. 2d 299, 304, 437 P.2d 439, 443-44, 66
Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-5 (1968).
10. 374 U.S. 23, 38 (1963).
11. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1971).
13. To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense be a felony, and in all
cases a peace officer, may break open the door or window of the house in which
the person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for
which admittance is desired.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1972).
14. In Ker, the Court upheld California's judicially created exceptions to the announcem6nt requirement which permit a breaking without the usually required preliminaries when police reasonably believe announcement would result in the destruction
of evidence, increased peril to the officers, or frustration of the arrest. 374 U.S. at 4041. Although Justice Clark's plurality opinion held that the exceptions were constitutionally permissible, it is clear that the Court regarded the announcement requirement
as constitutionally based. The opinion, concurred in by three Justices, recognized that
"the method of entering the home may offend federal standards of reasonableness."
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classified the entry of California police officers into defendant's apartment by means of a passkey as a breaking.15

been no

federal1

Since Ker there have

7

or state' cases deviating from its inclusion of pass-

Id. at 38. Justice Brennan's dissent, in which three other members of the Court joined,
argued that the "minimal conditions" for the invocation of an exception to the announcement requirement were not present. Id. at 61. Thus, eight members of the Ker
Court understood the announcement requirement to be constitutionally mandated.
In addition, state courts have ruled that violations of their jurisdictions' breaking
and entering rules violate the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Duke v. Superior Court,
1 Cal. 3d 314, 324, 461 P.2d 628, 635, 82 Cal. Rptr. 348, 355 (1969) (entry by
police through closed but unlocked door after only thirty seconds wait after knocking
made subsequent search unreasonable under fourth amendment); Greven v. Superior
Court, 71 Cal. 2d 287, 290, 455 P.2d 432, 434, 78 Cal. Rptr. 504, 506 (1969) (search
unreasonable under the fourth amendment when it follows breaking open door only
fifteen seconds after knocking); People v. Garber, 275 Cal. App. 2d 119, 131, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 214, 222 (1969) (entries in violation of § 844 render any following search unreasonable under fourth amendment); People v. Floyd, 260 N.E.2d 815, 817 (N.Y.
1970) (police entry by passkey without prior announcement was violation of fourth
amendment); State v. Furry, 286 N.E.2d 301, 304-05 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (entry without prior announcement violative of fourth amendment); State v. Wetteland, 496 P.2d 27, 29 (Ore. Ct. App. 1972) (fourth amendment forbids breaking
in absence of exigent circumstances); State v. Monteith, 477 P.2d 224, 227 (Ore.
Ct. App. 1970) (use of stealth and strategems to gain admittance does not run
afoul of the. fourth amendment); State v. Olson, 462 P.2d 681, 684 (Ore. Ct.
App. 1969) (police entry without asking permission not unreasonable within fourth
amendment since the door was open and the officer announced himself first and
waited before entering); Commonwealth v. DeMichel, 277 A.2d 159, 163 (Pa.
1971) (fourth amendment requires notice of identity and purpose before officer enters private premises to search or arrest); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 272 A.2d 271,
272 (Pa. 1970) (fourth amendment requires that before a policeman enters a private
premise to conduct a search or make an arrest, he must give notice of his identity
and purpose in absence of exigent circumstances); Commonwealth v. Newman, 240
A.2d 795, 799 (Pa. 1968) (forceful entry twenty seconds after making an announcement and receiving no response violated fourth amendment); Coleman v. Reilley, 508
P.2d 1035, 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (announcement requirement an essential element of a reasonable search); State v. Miller, 499 P.2d 241, 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973)
("break open" as used in arrest statute, does not, when read in light of the fourth and
fourteenth amendments, require forcible breaking).
15. 374 U.S. at 37.
16. See, e.g., Jack v. United States, 387 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 934 (1967), appeal after remand, 439 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
920 (1971) (entry by passkey obtained without permission of tenant constitutes a
breaking and as such must be tested by federal standards under which such a breaking is
allowed after a proper announcement); Dickey v. United States, 332 F.2d 773, 777 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 948 (1964) (dicta indicating that although entry gained
by ruse not a breaking under 18 U.S.C. § 3109, entry by a passkey would have been
a breaking); Munoz v. United States, 325 F.2d 23, 26 (9th Cir. 1963) (entry into
defendant's room by use of passkey obtained from clerk amounted to the same thing
as "breaking open his door"); United States v. Sims, 231 F. Supp. 251, 254 (D. Md.
1964) (entry into defendant's hotel room by use of a passkey was a breaking and
hence an illegal entry).
17. See, e.g., People v. Flores, 68 Cal. 2d 563, 567, 440 P.2d 233, 235, 68 Cal. Rptr.
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key entries within the definition of the term "breaking."
11.

UNLOCKED BUT CLOSED DOORS

A word is not a crystal, dransparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to
the circumstancesand time in which it is used.18

A similar analysis is appropriate when police enter through a closed
but unlocked door.

As in the passkey entries, there is no initial dan-

ger to property, but there does exist an inherent possibility of violent
confrontation as well as an obvious invasion of privacy. However, unlike the treatment of entry through a closed and locked door with the
aid of a key, several courts have been reluctant to hold that an entry
through an unlocked door is a breaking. They regarded the opening of

a locked door as involving sufficient force to constitute a breaking;
the opening of an unlocked door, however, was perceived as not em-

ploying force and therefore not a breaking.
Through the 1950's and 1960's, the federal circuits were split over
the issue.

The District Court of the District of Columbia has held

force to be an indispensable element of the federal announcement statute in United States v. Bowman 9 and again in United States v. Silverman.2 0 These cases, however, were overruled in Keiningham v. United
States.21 There, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
161, 163, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1968) (police entry by use of defendant's key
constituted a breaking); People v. Hamilton, 257 Cal. App. 2d 296, 302, 64 Cal. Rptr.
578, 582 (1967) (while holding entry through closed but unlocked door was a breaking, the court stated use of a key to open locked door without permission was a forcible entry and thus a breaking); People v. Stephens, 249 Cal. App. 2d 113, 116, 57
Cal. Rptr. 66, 68 (1967) (entry by passkey into defendant's apartment without announcement after knocking and receiving no response was illegal under Penal Code §
844); People v. Arellano, 239 Cal. App. 2d 389, 393, 48 Cal. Rptr. 686, 688 (1965)
(passkey entry into defendant's hotel room unannounced in absence of exigent circumstances was illegal even though defendant's parole had been revoked); Berigan v. State,
236 A.2d 743, 745 (Md. Ct. App. 1968) (officers entering defendant's hotel room behind the manager who let himself in was equivalent to a breaking); People v. Floyd,
260 N.E.2d 815, 817 (N.Y. 1970) (use of hotel passkey was a breaking); State
v. Gassner, 488 P.2d 822, 823 n.1 (Ore. Ct. App. 1971) (for purposes of determining
whether officers executing search warrant have made an unauthorized entry, the use
of a passkey is a breaking); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 272 A.2d 271, 272 (Pa.
1970) (passkey entry into student room constitutes breaking).
18. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (emphasis added).
19. 137 F. Supp. 385, 388 (D.D.C. 1956) ("So long as the entry is peaceful and
there is no breaking of parts of the house, the execution of the search warrant is legal.").
20. 166 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D.D.C. 1958) (illegal entry "limited to a situation in
which the officer broke into the premises by force .....
21. 287 F.2d 126, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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was confronted with an unannounced police entry into the porch
area of a home through a closed but unlocked door. Once in the
porch area, the police announced themselves and then entered an interior door leading to the inside of the premises where the arrest and
search were effected.22 After discussing the distinction between entering through a locked and unlocked door as recognized by the lower
courts in Silverman and Bowman, the court proceeded to reject it.
Circuit Judge Bastian concluded:
[A] person's right to privacy in his home . . . is governed by something more than the fortuitous circumstance of an unlocked door, and
. ..the word "break" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3109, means to enter
without permission. We think that a "peaceful" entry which does
not violate the provisions of § 3109 must be a permissive one, and
not merely one which does not result in a breaking of parts of the
2
house. 3
In United States v. Poppitt,24 the District Court of Delaware compared the Bowman and Keiningham decision and concluded that the
Keiningham interpretation of section 3109 was consistent with the
common law. Citing Professor Wilgus 25 as authority, the court
stated, "ITihe concept of 'breaking' for the purpose of serving a warrant is the same as in burglary: '. . . lifting a latch, turning a door22. The late Professor William Prosser described Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162
N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) as "a law professor's dream of an examination question." W.
PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 254 (4th ed. 1971). The same can be said of Keiningham.
The arresting officers possessed arrest warrants for all the appellants and a search warrant for the home next door to the one in which the suspects were eventually arrested.
The police entered the dwelling where they believed the suspects were to be found by
stepping, unannounced, through its open front door. They then found themselves confronted by two other doors leading to different portions of the home. After making
proper announcements at each of these doors, the officers were admitted through
one door, but receiving no response at the other, they entered uninvited. Neither
search proved fruitful. The officers, however, grew suspicious when they noticed a
freshly cut partition leading to the porch of the home next door. Without announcement, they entered by opening this closed but unlocked door. After viewing the suspects and various gambling paraphernalia through the glass pane of an interior door,
they announced themselves and entered the inside of the dwelling. There the arrest
and search were made. In determining the rights and liabilities of all the parties, the
court found the only relevant entry to be that which the police made unannounced
through the partition. 287 F.2d at 128-29.
23. 287 F.2d at 130. Keiningham was followed in Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d
894, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1961), where Judge Bazelon stated it would be "sheer sophistry" to
describe as peaceful, the entry of three officers into a home with drawn weapons.
24. 227 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.Del. 1964) (opening of unlocked screen door by federal
officers executing search warrant constituted a breaking within § 3109).
25. Wilgus, supranote 1, at 806 (footnotes omitted).
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knob or pushing open a closed door ....
On the other hand, in United States v. Games27 the Second Circuit

echoed the feelings of the Bowman court when it held that the exclusion
of evidence for a violation of section 3109, as called for in Miller v.
United States28 and Accarino v. United States,29 "is applicable only
where the arresting officers forcibly break into and enter the dwelling."3 0 Eight years later in United States v. Conti,"' the same court

held that "it is clearly established in this circuit that 'breaking' in the
statute means forcible entry."32
26. 227 F. Supp. at 80 (footnote omitted). The entire Wilgus quotation is:
What constitutes police "breaking" seems to be the same as in burglary: lifting a
latch, turning a door knob, unhooking a chain or hasp, removing a prop to, or
pushing open, a closed door of entrance to the house-even a closed screen door,
though not a storm door, is a breaking; so, too, is pushing it higher, or removing a
window screen; raising a trap door, or a cellar window grating, or even climbing
down the chimney, are breakings; but contrary to the rule in burglary, obtaining
admission by stratagem by officer is not a "breaking," if not accompanied by false
pretense and violent entry.
Wilgus, supra note 1, at 806 (footnotes omitted). This convenient summary is misleading. The paragraph seems to be saying that the different types of "breakings" given as examples are cases in which courts have applied the elements of
burglary to define breaking by police. Thus Professor Wilgus gave the impression
that there existed a large body of cases holding that the elements of burglary
defined a police breaking. However, a review of the cases Professor Wilgus cited
reveals that they all relate to breakings in criminal burglary cases and do not
discuss police entry.
For example: Walker v. State, 52 Ala. 376 (1875) (going down a chimney is a
burglary); State v. O'Brien, 46 N.W. 861 (Iowa 1890) (lifting a latch in order to enter is a breaking within the definition of burglary); State v. Powell, 58 P. 968 (Kan.
1899) (when the door was closed and fastened with a post, its removal was a "breaking" in burglary); State v. Groning, 5 P. 446 (Kan. 1885) (lifting of a latch of a
closed door and pushing open the door is a sufficient breaking to constitute burglary);
State v. Hecox, 83 Mo. 531 (1884) (opening a door which is closed and fastened is a
breaking sufficient to meet the element required in burglary).
The first of the two authorities supportive of his original assertion is Annot., 61
Am. Dec. 156 (1911). That annotation does discuss a long common law history
which holds that police entry of a dwelling through a closed door does constitute a
breaking. However, the subject matter of the annotation concerned courts' treatment of
police entry to serve civil process and not police entry to effect an arrest.
The other authority is H. VooRHESS, LAW OF ARREST §§ 183-90 (1904). The actual sections dealing with police breaking are §§ 159, 172-82. See Sabbath v. United
States, 391 U.S. 585, 590 n.5. Mr. Voorhess does discuss the subject of police breaking,
but his citations are the same as those Professor Wilgus used and deal only with breaking with regard to the service of civil process.
27. 258 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 937 (1959).
28. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
29. 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
30. 258 F.2d at 533.
31. 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966). See Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d
781, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960) (opening closed but
unlocked door was not a forceful entry and thus not a breaking under California law).
32. 361 F.2d at 157.
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At least two state courts have endorsed the burglary analogy. The
Supreme Court of Florida held that an officer's opening of an unlocked screen door constituted an "entry by breaking" in Bennefield
v. State. 3 The California supreme court reached a similar conclusion in
35
People v. Rosales,3 4 a case of far reaching influence.
The actual facts of Rosales are somewhat unclear. Some of the
arresting officers appear to have entered the home of the defendant by
opening either an unlocked screen or a wooden door, while others apparently entered a different door with the aid of a passkey. Writing for
the four justice majority, Chief Justice Traynor overturned earlier lower
court precedent 36 by stating:
Although the common law rule was first articulated to regulate entry
by force, it is not limited to entries effected by physical violence
. . . . At the very least it covers unannounced entries that would be
considered breaking as the term is used in defining common law
burglary. .. . As so defined, no more is needed "than the opening
of a door or window, even if not locked, or not even latched. Pulling
open a screen door held closed only by a spring is sufficient."3 7
Chief Justice Traynor's comments proved to have an impact beyond
California's borders. Only a few months after the Rosales decision was
handed down, the United States Supreme Court confronted the same issue in determining whether police entry through a closed but unlocked
door was a breaking within the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 3109.38 In
Sabbath v. United States, 39 the Supreme Court utilized much of Justice
Traynor's analysis as it ended the split in federal courts by erasing the
distinction between entry through a closed but unlocked door and
entry through a locked door.
Sabbath involved the entry of federal customs agents into the defendant's Los Angeles apartment by opening a closed but unlocked door
without announcing themselves. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
had ruled that the officers had not "broken open" the door within the
meaning of section 3109., ° Justice Marshall, writing for eight4 1 mem33. 160 So. 2d 706, 708-09 (Fla. 1964). The court relied upon the prior Florida
case of Boyton v. State, 64 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1953) which held that merely pushing
a door open was a breaking under the Florida constitution. Id. at 548.
34. 68 Cal. 2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968).
35. See text accompanying notes 38-46 infra.
36. People v. Feeley, 179 Cal. App. 2d 100, 3 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1960).
37. 68 Cal. 2d at 303, 437 P.2d at 492, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 4, quoting Wilgus, supra
note 1, at 806.
38. See note 2 supra for the text of this statute.

39. 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
40. 380 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
41. Justice Black dissented without a separate opinion. 391 U.S. at 591.
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bers of the Court held that the agents' entry was a breaking even

though the door had been unlocked.42
Citing Justice Brennan's comments in Miller v. United States,48 and
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in McDonald v. United States,4 4

Justice Marshall concluded that the two underlying purposes of the
statute are the protection of the homeowner's right to privacy in his own
home and the safeguarding of the policeman who might be mistaken
for an unlawful intruder.4 5 Considering these purposes, he specifically
held that entry through a closed but unlocked door is a breaking under

18 U.S.C. § 3109 even though such entry is not gained by the use of
force:
[I]t would indeed be a "grudging application" to hold . . . that the
use of "force" is an indispensable element of the statute. To be sure,
the statute uses the phrase "break open" and that connotes some use
of force. But linguistic analysis seldom is adequate when a statute is
42. Id. at 588.
43. 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958). See note 7 supra.
44. 335 U.S. 451 (1948). In McDonald, police entered a rooming house without
a search warrant. Observing through a window that the petitioner was operating a lottery, they entered, arrested petitioner, and seized evidence. The Court held
the evidence inadmissible since the search had been conducted without a warrant. Id.
at 456. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion discussed the officer's entry and
chose to emphasize the danger of violent confrontation inherent in such intrusions:
Many homeowners in this crime-beset city doubtless are armed. When a woman
sees a strange man, in plain clothes, prying up her bedroom window and climbing
in, her natural impulse would be to shoot. A plea of justifiable homicide might
result awkwardly for enforcement officers. But an officer seeing a gun being
drawn on him might shoot first. Under the circumstances of this case, I should
not want the task of convincing a jury that it was not murder. I have no reluctance in condemning as unconstitutional a method of law enforcement so reckless
and so fraught with danger and discredit to the law enforcement agencies themselves.
Id. at 460-61. Though Justice Jackson's remarks would seem to suggest a fear that both
officer and occupant might be injured, Justice Marshall limited his concern to safeguarding officers. 391 U.S. at 539. Justice Jackson also said, in words not quoted in
Sabbath:
But it seems to me that each tenant of a building, while he has no right to exclude from the common hallways those who enter lawfully, does have a personal
and constitutionally protected interest in the integrity and security of the entire
building against unlawful breaking and entry. Here the police gained access to
their peeking post by means that were not merely unauthorized but by means that
were forbidden by law and denounced as criminal. In prying up the porch window and climbing into the landlady's bedroom, they were guilty of breaking and
entering-a felony in law and a crime far more serious than the one they were
engaged in suppressing. Having forced an entry without either a search warrant
or an arrest warrant to justify it, the felonious character of their entry, it seems to
me, followed every step of their journey inside the house and tainted its fruits
with illegality.
335 U.S. at 458-59.
45. 391 U.S. at 589.
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designed to incorporate fundamental values and the ongoing develop46
ment of the common law.

The Sabbath Court's debt to Justice Traynor's Rosales opinion is apparent. Justice Marshall buttressed his reasoning that force was not required to constitute a breaking under the statutory definition by citing
to the "useful analogy afforded by the. . development of the law of
burglary: a forcible entry has generally been eliminated as an element
of that crime under statutes using the word 'break'. . .."47
The Sabbath conclusion has been followed in the lower federal
courts,48 and various state courts, including Indiana, 49 Delaware,5°
Maryland,5 1 and Ohio, have found it persuasive. Indeed, although
Sabbath is a statutorily based decision, numerous lower courts have

held its conclusion to be a minimum requirement under the fourth
amendment.5

3

III.

OPEN DOOR ENTRY

The door is open, I must say,
54
Iratherfancy it that way.
Entries made by breaking down a locked door clearly offend against

all three policy considerations: they involve destruction of property,
46. Id.
47. Id. at 589 n.5.
48. United States v. Pratter, 465 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1972) (unauthorized entry
effected by use of no more force than is necessary to turn knob and open unlocked
door is breaking within the meaning of § 3109); United States v. Wylie, 462 F.2d
1178, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Indubitably .. .entry through the closed but unlocked
back door was an intrusion to which § 3109 would ordinarily apply."); United States
v. Davis, 346 F. Supp. 435, 441 (S.D. Ill. 1972) (opening a wooden storm door a
breaking); United States v. McClard, 333 F. Supp. 158, 167 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd
per curiam, 462 F.2d 488 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972).
49. Hadly v. State, 238 N.E.2d 888, 897-99 (Ind. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012
(1969) (concurring opinion) (opening of unlocked screen door a breaking, but excused
on grounds of "hot pursuit").
50. Dyton v. State, 250 A.2d 383, 385 (Del. 1969) (officers entering after their
knock caused the door to swing open revealing occupants who made no attempt to
answer, met "the demands of the Sabbath opinion.").
51. Mabane v. State, 256 A.2d 701, 703 n.1 (Md. 1969) (assumed sufficient force
used to effectuate a breaking where officers entered by reaching through an aperture
opening the door by means of an inside handle).
52. State v. Furry, 286 N.E.2d 301, 305 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (evidence excluded
on ground that arresting officers failed to announce their purpose before entering the
house of defendants through an unlocked but closed screen door).
53. See note 14 supra.
54. People v. Anderson, 9 Cal. App. 3d 80, 85, 88 Cal. Rptr. 4, 7 (1970) (emphasis added).
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possible violence, and intrusion into privacy.r" Passkey entries and
entries through a closed but unlocked door do not involve a physical
breaking, and therefore present no possibility of property damage." °

Nonetheless, the policy considerations of preventing violence and protecting privacy have led to the classification of such entries as break-

ings within the statutory meaning. 57
Once courts had generally adopted the Sabbath and Rosales rationale, that the force or violence of the entry was not an essential element of the statute's application in view of the growing regard for
the protection of privacy and prevention of dangerous confrontation, 18 it would seem logical for the next step in the; evolution of
the law to have been for the courts to hold all non-consensual police
entries to be breakings.

Indeed, if the interest involved were restricted

to protection from unnecessary property damage, there would be no
reason at all to condemn entry through a closed but unlocked door.5 9
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide a case involving
the question of police entry through an open door. Circuit courts
treating the issue before and after Sabbath's resolution of the closed

but unlocked door question have reached different conclusions. The
Second, 0 Sixth, 61 Seventh, 62 and Ninth 3 Circuits have treated an un55. See note 6 supra.
56. See note 5 supra.
57. See notes 10-52 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 34-52 supra and accompanying text.
59. Comment, Unannounced Entry to Search: The Law and No-Knock Bill (S.
3246), 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 205, 211. Of course, it can also be argued that the "reasonable expection of privacy" one has in his home is considerably less when the door
is open than when it is closed. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
60. United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated on other
grounds, 390 U.S. 204 (1968) ("[I]t is clearly established in this circuit that 'breaking' in the statute means forcible entry."); United States v. Monticallos, 349 F.2d 80,
81-82 (2d Cir. 1965) (no breaking where agents enter unannounced by following a
prospective customer for narcotics through an open door); United States v. Games,
258 F.2d 530, 533 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 937 (1959) (holding the
doctrines of Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) and Accarino v. United
States, 179 F.2d 456, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1949) are applicable only when arresting officers forcibly break into and enter the dwelling); United States ex rel. Turco v. Dross,
224 F. Supp. 142, 144-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (New York announcement statute, almost
a verbatim copy of § 3109, did not include entry through an open door as a breaking,
nor would such entry be a breaking under the common law).
61. United States v. Williams, 351 F.2d 475, 477 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 917 (1966) (state announcement statute not of assistance on the question of
whether a search following an unannounced entrance by officers through an open door
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announced but peaceful entry through an open door, as not constituting

a breaking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109.
The Second and Sixth Circuits, however, have not discussed the issue since Sabbath was handed down, whereas the Seventh Circuit has

sought to evade the impact of Sabbath by narrowly reading the case.
In United States v. Lopez, 64 narcotics agents eavesdropping in the next

apartment heard defendant say he was leaving his apartment.

Ten

agents waited for defendant to open his door and then rushed into his

apartment, seizing 474 grams of heroin.6 5 The Seventh Circuit limited
Sabbath to its facts, i.e., entry through a closed but unlocked door," 6
and held that the open door entry before the court was not a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 3109.67
Though the Ninth Circuit has spoken of entries through open doors
three times since Sabbath, each of these discussions has been dictum. 68
was lawful and the fourth amendment not violated by a search following such an
entrance under the circumstances there appearing).
62. United States v. Lopez, 475 F.2d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1973) (entry by officers
waiting for defendant to open door was not a breaking); United States v. Rowlette,
397 F.2d 475, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1968) (unannounced entry by officers through the
open door of defendant's motel room did not invalidate the arrest).
63. United States v. Vargas, 436 F.2d 1280, 1281 (9th Cir. 1971) (18 U.S.C. § 3109
aimed at closed or locked doors); Reyes v. United States, 417 F.2d 916, 919 (9th
Cir. 1969) ("[Ejntry through an open doorway without force does not constitute a 'breaking,' and hence does not require notice of authority and purpose."); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1969) (police entry after occupant has opened door as
result of police ruse not an entry under California's announcement statute, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 844); Sabbath v. United States, 380 F.2d 108, 111 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'd on
other grounds, 391 U.S. 585 (1968) (see notes 37-46 and accompanying text supra)
("An entry through an open door is not a breaking, even though there be no
permission."); Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1965) (stating there is no language in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), supporting
the position that the entry must be with consent when the door is open); Hopper v.
United States, 267 F.2d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 1959) (entry through an open door not
a breaking under a Washington statute substantially like 18 U.S.C. § 3109).
64. 475 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1973).
65. Id. at 539.
66. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
67. 475 F.2d at 541. This was the same result as that reached in United States
v. Rowlette, 397 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1968), decided only two weeks after Sabbath.
68. In United States v. Vargas, 436 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1971), the court stated that
18 U.S.C. § 3109 was aimed at closed or locked doors in a case where the officers had
in fact announced their identity and purpose before entry and thus had complied with
the statute. In Reyes v. United States, 417 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1969), the arresting
agent knocked on defendant's door and was admitted without announcing his identity.
Upon being informed that the defendant was in her bedroom, he quickly entered and
placed her under arrest. The court held that the "[pirecedent in this court and the Supreme Court of the United States indicates that entry through an open door without
force does not constitute a breaking, and hence does not require notice of authority
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On the other hand, the District of Columbia Circuit has held that any
entry, whether peaceful or not, if unannounced, constitutes a breaking.00
Similarly, the Third ° and perhaps the Fifth71 Circuits have also favored this broader interpretation. Those state court decisions on point
since Sabbath have generally given an expansive definition of the
term.

Washington, 72 Colorado, 73 and, arguably, Pennsylvania, 74 Ore-

and purpose." Id. at 919. Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969) dealt with the
slightly more complicated but nevertheless distinct problem of a ruse entry. See notes
114-60 infra and accompanying text. The arresting officers had the motel manager
announce there was a telephone call for the defendant's female companion. When she
opened the door, the officers entered and arrested her and the defendant. In a habeas
corpus proceeding, the Ninth Circuit held that the unannounced entry was not in violation of the California announcement statute, reasoning that
[t]he employment of a ruse which results in the occupant of a dwelling voluntarily
opening the door and thereby allowing officers to enter without announcement of
purpose, is not a breaking, and therefore not violative of California arrest law.
Id. at 626.
69. United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74, 82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 986
(1970) (an entry without consent ordinarily amounts to a breaking and thus it is required that officers first announce their purpose and authority); Bosley v. United
States, 426 F.2d 1257, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (announcement prior to entry of suspects
apartment through open door held useless gesture when defendant was asleep on
couch); Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (where officers
entered through a partially open door, the court stated: "The Government does not
seriously dispute that Miller requires officers, who seek to invade the privacy of an
individual's home, to announce their authority and their purpose in demanding entrance before 'barging in.. . ."'). In Keiningham v. United States, 287 F.2d 126,
130 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the court opined, "We think that a 'peaceful' entry which does
not violate the provisions of § 3109 must be a permissive one, and not merely one
which does not result in a breaking of parts of the house."
70. United States v. Burruss, 306 F. Supp. 915, 920 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (unannounced
police entry through an open doorway a breaking).
71. Wittner v. United States, 406 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1969). In holding that the
statute need not be complied with when the occupant was previously aware of the
officers' presence and purpose, the court stated the Sabbath rule to be that "§ 3109
governs unannounced entries by police whether .. . forcible or nonforcible." Id. at
1166.
72. State v. Miller, 499 P.2d 241, 245 (Wash. CL App. 1972) (unannounced entry
by officer after an occupant opened door unaware of detective's presence is a breaking
under the Sabbath rationale).
73. People v. Godinas, 490 P.2d 945 (Colo. 1971). The court noted that "forceful
entries need not involve the actual breaking of doors and windows, but may include
merely entries made without permission." Id. at 947.
74. Commonwealth v. DeMichel, 277 A.2d 159, 163 (Pa. 1971). In a case where
officers broke down defendant's front door, the court stated in dictum that
[i]t is settled in this Commonwealth that the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures demands that before a police officer
enters upon private premises to conduct a search or to make an arrest, he must,
absent exigent circumstances, give notice of his identity and announce his purpose.
Id.
The facts of this case present an interesting problem. If the court strictly construes
the need for some force, albeit minimal, before an entry can constitute a breaking,
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gon,7 5: and Florida" have in one form or another viewed entry without consent through an open door as a breaking.

Unquestionably, the greatest amount of litigation on the issue since
Sabbath has taken place in California. 7

No less than eighteen decisions

have dealt with police entries through an open door under California's
announcement statutes. Four of the first five California cases to dis-

cuss the matter determined that entry through an open door did not
constitute a breaking. 78 For example, the court deciding People v.
then it is possible it could hold an entry through a partially open door, which the
police must open the rest of the way before entering, to be a breaking, but not
hold an entry through an already wide open doorway to be a breaking. Thus, the
law may depend upon "whether a police officer is thin enough to squeeze through a
partially open door." Comment, Unannounced Entry to Search: The Law and NoKnock Bill (S. 3246), 1970 WAsH. U.L.Q. at 208 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., United
State v. Ramos, 380 F.2d 717, 721 (2d Cir. 1967) (although pushing open a partially
open door was a breaking, it was done after announcement of officer's authority and
purpose); Dickey v. United States, 332 F.2d 773, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1964) (pushing
open all the way a door already partially open after a ruse would have been a breaking
had not the door been opened entirely by the occupant); Gatewood v. United States,
209 F.2d 789, 790-91 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (officer's pushing open a door partially opened
as a result of a ruse was a breaking); United States ex rel. Dyton v. Ellingsworth, 306
F. Supp. 231, 236 (D.C. Del. 1969) (although pushing open a partially open door was
a breaking, it was excused since the occupant knew of the officer's presence and purpose).
75. State v. Gassner, 488 P.2d 822, 823 (Ore. Ct. App. 1971).
76. Urquhart v. State, 211 So. 2d 79, 83 (Fla. CL App. 1968) (police officers' pushing open door to house, after guest had partially opened door following officers' request
to see an occupant of the house, constituted a breaking).
77. California Penal Code Sections 1531 and 844 govern the matter in regard to
entries for the purpose of search and arrest respectively. They provide:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any
part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.
CAL. PNrAL CODE § 1531 (West 1972).
To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense be a felony, and in all cases
a peace officer, may break open the door or window of the house in which the
person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for believing
him to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for
which admittance is desired.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1972). These sections have been held to be identical
in principle so far as their announcement requirements are concerned. Greven v.
Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 287, 292 n.6, 455 P.2d 432, 435 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr. 504, 507
n.6 (1969); Hart v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 3d 496, 500, 98 Cal. Rptr. 565, 568
(1971); People v. Garnett, 6 Cal. App. 3d 280, 290 n.2, 85 Cal. Rptr. 769, 774 n.2
(1970); People v. Garber, 275 Cal. App. 2d 119, 131, 30 Cal. Rptr. 214, 222 (1969);
People v. Villanueva, 220 Cal. App. 2d 443, 447, 33 Cal. Rptr. 811, 813 (1963).
78. People v. Rodriguez, 274 Cal. App. 2d 770, 774, 79 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243 (1969)
(entry through an open door is not a breaking nor is it repugnant to or inconsistent
with the United States Constitution); People v. Naughton, 270 Cal. App. 2d 1, 9, 75
Cal. Rptr. 451, 457 (1969) (following People v. Taylor infra as precedent in a case
of criminal burglary); People v. Taylor, 266 Cal. App. 2d 14, 17-18, 71 Cal. Rptr. 886,
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Hamilton7" stated in dictum, "If a door is found open by the officer or
opened to him, although not by the defendant who is intended to be
placed under arrest, the officer may enter without warning ....
A contrary view was taken by only one of the five cases, People v.
Beamon.1 The Beamon court viewed the California supreme court's
Rosales decision that entry through a closed but unlocked door was a
breaking to stand for the notion that no person may be arrested in
his home unless the arresting officers first announce their purpose
82
and authority. The court rejected the reasoning of a prior decision
that at common law an entry through an open door was not regarded
as a breaking and held that police "may not enter through the open
door of a house without first demanding admittance and explaining the
purpose for which admittance is desired .
,,. The court noted
that if analogy to the law of burglary is to be considered, it should
be remembered that in California no breaking or forcible entry is
required 4 and that a burglary can be committed by entering through
an open door or window. 5
The issue finally reached the California supreme court in People v.
Bradley."" In that case, the arresting officers approached the fully open
888 (1968) (swinging open of a door upon being subjected only to a rapping of the
kind that is a common prelude to a request for admission, more analogous to the opendoor cases than to cases where the door was closed and th refore not a breaking);
People v. Hamilton, 257 Cal. App. 2d 296, 302, 64 Cal. Rptr. 578, 582 (1967) (officers
entering closed but unlocked door without prior announcement rendered evidence
seized inadmissible).
79. 257 Cal. App. 2d 296, 64 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1967).
80. Id. at 302, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 252 (citations omitted).
81. 268 Cal. App. 2d 61, 73 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1968).
82. People v. Taylor, 266 Cal. App. 2d 14, 71 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1968).
83. 268 Cal. App. 2d at 64, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 606 (footnotes omitted).
84. Id. at 65, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 607. See, e.g., People v. Talbot, 64 Cal. 2d 691,
414 P.2d 633, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1966); People v. Failla, 64 Cal. 2d 560, 414 P.2d
39, 51 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1966); People v. Sears, 62 Cal. 2d 737, 401 P.2d 938, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 330 (1965); People v. Garcia, 214 Cal. App. 2d 681, 29 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1963);
People v. Chambers, 189 Cal. App. 2d 780, 11 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1961); People v. Wilson,
160 Cal. App. 2d 606, 325 P.2d 106 (1958).
The California Penal Code defines burglary thus:
Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse,
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, railroad car, trailer
coach as defined by the Vehicle Code, vehicle as defined by said code when the
doors of such vehicle are locked, aircraft as defined by the Harbors and Navigagation Code, mine or any underground portion thereof, with intent to commit
grand or petty larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 1972).
85. See, e.g., People v. Failla, 64 Cal. 2d 560, 414 P.2d 39, 51 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1966);
People v. Massey, 196 Cal. App. 2d 230, 16 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1961).
86. 1 Cal. 3d 80, 460 P.2d 129, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1969).
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door of the defendant's house at 3:15 a.m. With the aid of a flashlight, they saw the defendant asleep in bed. The officers silently en87
tered and made the arrest.
Justice Burke, writing for the majority, chose to take an intermediate position. Citing Sabbath to the effect that "'linguistic analysis is
seldom adequate when a statute is designed to incorporate fundamental values and the ongoing development of the common law,' "88
he declared that when the legislature codifies a common law rule, it
does not necessarily freeze that rule:
Although § 844 codified the common law rule requiring peace officers to demand admittance and explain their purpose before they break
open a door or window, the section is silent or inexplicit as to whether
the officers must make such a demand and explanation before they
enter a house through an open door. Even if at common law an announced intrusion through an open door was lawful, we are satisfied
in view of the purposes of § 844, as stated in People v. Rosales, that
the demand and explanation requirements of that section also apply
where, as here, officers walk into a dwelling through an open door at
nighttime when the occupant apparently is asleep.89
Justice Burke warned that one of the consequences "of such an unannounced intrusion could be resistance to the intruders and violent death
or injury to them or others including innocent third parties.""0
After thus restricting his holding to the narrowest interpretation of
the facts of the case, Justice Burke went on to expressly disapprove of
the dictum9 1 in People v. Hamilton to the extent to which it was inconsistent with Bradley."2 However, he also considered it unnecessary
9 3
for the court to decide the issue as broadly as in People v. Beamon.
We intimate no view whether in the absence of an excuse for compliance under the exceptions to section 844 the demand and explanation
requirements of that section apply to all entries through an open door
(including e.g. entrance through an open door by a uniformed officer
during the day where immediately after crossing the threshold he an94
nounces'himself and his purpose).
87. Id. at 83-84, 460 P.2d at 130-31, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 458-59.
88. Id. at 87, 460 P.2d at 133, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 461, quoting Sabbath v. United
States, 391 U.S. at 589.
89. 1 Cal. 3d at 87, 460 P.2d at 133, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 460 (emphasis added and
citation omitted).
90. Id. at 88, 460 P.2d at 135, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
91. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
92. 1 Cal. 3d at 88, 460 P.2d at 134, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
93. See text accompanying notes 79-83 supra.
94. 1 Cal. 3d at 87-88 n.1, 460 P.2d at 133 n.1, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 461 n.1 (emphasis added).
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Justice Burke went on to say that though the court had chosen not to
rule on the question, it would nonetheless be "advisable" for officers to
always announce their authority and purpose before entering a house
through an open door to make an arrest, unless the case came within
an established exception to section 844. 95
The question left open in Bradley was first confronted by a California
court in People v. Norton." The court concluded that entry during
the daytime through an open door does require compliance with section
844 unless otherwise excused. 97 Substantially the same conclusion was
reached in People v. Arias9 8 where the court saw no reason to distinguish between nighttime and daytime open door entry in a situation
where the occupants were asleep with a butcher knife beside their bed. 9
Privacy, the court argued, could be invaded during the day as well as
night and a daytime entry might in fact be met by more violence.
Accordingly, the court held that a "police officer may not enter through
an open door of a house without first demanding admittance and explaining the purpose for which admittance is desired."' 100 The same
conclusion was reached in People v. Anderson' and People v. Lawrence.10 2 In People v. Hayko,10 3 the state conceded that a breaking
could occur when an officer entered through an open door. 0 4
95. Id. at 87-88, 460 P.2d at 133, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 461. Justice Tobriner, concurring
and dissenting in a separate opinion signed by Justices Peters and Sullivan, would
have made Justice Burke's advice the law. Justice Tobriner felt the "unduly restrictive"
language of the majority opinion was an invitation to "unnecessary litigation" which
would result from cases "involving daytime entries, and entries upon awakened or apparently awakened occupants." 1 Cal. 3d at 90, 460 P.2d at 135, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 463,
citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) and People v. Rosales, 68 Cal. 2d
299, 437 P.2d 439, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968), as support for the proposition that section
844 serves to protect the privacy of occupants and their safety, as well as the safety of
police and bystanders. He concluded that "the intrusion upon privacy does not depend
upon the time of day; an awake occupant is perhaps more likely to offer violent resistance than a sleeping one." 1 Cal. 3d at 90, 460 P.2d at 135, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
He thus concluded that Beamon was the correct interpretation of Rosales and would
have held that the officer's entry was a violation of § 844, not because the occupant
was asleep and it was at night, but simply because there was no announcement in
a situation in which there was no excuse for the lack of announcement. 1 Cal. 3d
at 90, 460 P.2d at 135, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
96. 5 Cal. App. 3d 955, 86 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1970).
97. Id. at 963, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
98. 6 Cal. App. 3d 87, 85 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1970).
99. Id. at 93, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
100. Id. at 94, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
101. 9 Cal. App. 3d 80, 85, 88 Cal. Rptr. 4, 7 (1970).
102. 25 Cal. App. 3d 213, 222, 101 Cal. Rptr. 671, 676 (1972).
103. 7 Cal. App. 3d 604, 86 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1970).
104. Id. at 607, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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However, three other California appellate courts have ruled that when
a door is open and the officers view the occupants in the actual commission of a felony, their entry does not constitute a breaking under section

844.105 These rulings, however, confuse the question of what should
constitute a breaking, with the question of what should constitute an
exigent circumstance excusing non-compliance with the statute. It

would have been more reasonable if the courts had simply stated that
although the entry through defendant's open door was a breaking, the

fact that a felony was in progress at the time excused compliance with
106
the statute.
It would thus appear that the trend in California, as in Washington,'"7
Colorado,10 8 Pennsylvania, 109 Florida," 0 and Oregon,"' and in some
of the federal circuits".2 is to hold that a police entry for the purpose of

arrest or search constitutes a breaking, even if through a wide open
door, so long as it is without permission." 3
105. People v. Lee, 20 Cal. App. 3d 982, 987, 98 Cal. Rptr. 182, 187 (1971) (police
entry through open door without prior announcement held not to involve a breaking
since at the time the door opened, the officers perceived defendants actually "engaged
in the commission of a narcotic offense." Id. at 989-90); People v. Peterson, 9 Cal.
App. 3d 627, 633, 88 Cal. Rptr. 597, 600 (1970) (no breaking found where police
entered after occupant opened door even though no announcement since when door
was opened, officers smelled marijuana); People v. Boone, 2 Cal. App. 3d 66, 69, 82
Cal. Rptr. 398, 399-400 (1969) (§ 844 held not intended to apply to situations where a
felony was presently in progress). The approach taken by the Lee, Peterson, and Boone
courts was rejected in People v. Leighter, 15 Cal. App. 3d 389, 93 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1971).
There, one of the defendants opened the door in response to police knocking and the
police smelled marijuana. Their announcement, though immaterial in regard to arresting the defendant at the door, nonetheless was held to be a requirement before entering
to arrest the others not yet seen. Thus the uninvited entry constituted a breaking.
Id. at 397, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
106. The three recognized exceptions to the announcement requirement are discussed in note 14 supra. While there is currently no exception to the announcement
requirement when officers see an occupant engaged in the commission of a felony, these
three decisions do nothing less than create such an exception under the guise of interpreting the term "breaking."
107. See note 72 supra.
108. See note 73 supra.
109. See note 74 supra.
110. See note 76 supra.
111. See note 75 supra.
112. See notes 69-71 supra.
113. This should not be confused with nonconsensual entries such as those in Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), or Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206
(1966), where the Court held legal the entry of an undercover agent into defendant's
home or apartment for the purpose of gaining evidence as a result of a conversation
he heard while in the defendant's presence, and Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
305 (1921), holding a search and seizure unreasonable when government representatives gain entrance by stealth or guise to the home or office of one suspected of a
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RUSE ENTRY

An entry similar to open door entries is that procured by a police
ruse. Such entries occur when the police enter with the permission of
the occupant but without the occupant's knowledge that they are police
officers entering with the intent to arrest or search. The issue is whether or not it constitutes a breaking for police to gain entry into a
home as a result of permission gained by the use of subterfuge or ruse.
There appear to be two possible types of ruse entries. One is where
the ruse actually succeeds in gaining the officers an invitation into the
suspect's home. This can occur, for example, when officers in plainclothes announce themselves to be repairmen or announce themselves
to be police but misrepresent their reasons for desiring entry, and after
being admitted make their arrest. The other situation is where the
ruse succeeds only in getting the occupant to open the door. This type
of ruse can occur, for example, when the officers have the occupant's
motel manager knock and request to speak to the renter. As soon as
the door has been opened, the police enter and make the arrest.
In determining whether ruse entries are breakings, courts should
consider the three goals underlying the announcment rule: prevention
of property damage, violent confrontation, and privacy intrusions." 4
Certainly a ruse entry presents no danger of doors or windows being
destroyed. But the splintering of the door during entry no longer
seems the essence of the rule's application, as witness the courts' expansion of the definition of the term "breaking" to encompass passkey entries," 5 entries effected by opening a closed but unlocked door," 0 and
entries through already open doorways." 7 Clearly the courts in applying the announcement rule have been centrally concerned with the
threat of violent confrontation and invasion of privacy.
It might be argued that ruse entries are somehow unique in that they
do not present dangers of violent confrontation or invasion of privacy.
The argument would be that once the occupant has consented to the
crime and in the other's absence search for his papers without his knowledge or consent. Nor should this be confused with situations where the police gain entry by
means of threat, coercion, or duress as in Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d 666 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), where the court held that "invitations" to enter one's house, extended to
armed officers of the law who demand entrance, are usually to be considered as "'invitations secured by force."' Id. at 673, quoting Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649,
650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
114. See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 10-17 supra and accompanying text
116. See notes 18-52 supra and accompanying text
117. See notes 54-113 supra and accompanying text.
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entry of a gasman or a tax assessor, he has consented to an invasion of
privacy and is not likely to react violently. But, when a person opens
his front door expecting to be met by the milkman and is instead confronted by three armed officers who quickly rush across the threshold,
there would appear to be some danger of violence. On the other hand,
a ruse entry by an undercover agent would not ordinarily involve a
significant risk of confrontation. The question of whether or not a
risk of violence is substantial, apparently depends upon whether the
ruse will be exposed when the door is opened or whether the ruse will
be exposed at the convenience of the officer after entry. The former
involves significant risks; the latter does not.
Privacy considerations are no less relevant in spite of the argument
that when an occupant agrees to the admittance of one type of guest,
he cannot claim his privacy has been invaded when the identity of the
intruder proves to be other than he anticipated. This "all or nothing"
view of privacy ignores the distinction between abandoning one's expectation of privacy vis-a-vis a milkman and consenting to a police intrusion."18 On the other hand, the ruse entry is less intrusive of privacy than the "typical" breaking situation, where the occupant is not
forewarned that anyone is entering. In the ruse situation, the occupant is at least aware that someone is about to enter.
There is another policy consideration uniquely applicable to ruse
entries. This is the question of the desirability of police deception of
the citizenry as an instrument of law enforcement. While such deception might be tolerable under certain circumstances, few would proclaim its general desirability.1"'
If the analogy to burglary which was suggested in Rosales120 and
Sabbath121 is accepted, entry by deceit would certainly constitute a
breaking. Nevertheless, the rule today in this regard seems quite simi118. Cf. People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
There, the California supreme court extended the reasonable expectation of privacy as
set forth in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (concurring opinion),
to a case where officers found a bag containing marijuana in a trash can in defendant's
backyard. The court reasoned that the defendant had abandoned the marijuana and
had also abandoned his expectation of privacy insofar as a trashman was concerned but
still possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to the police. 71 Cal.
2d at 1104-05, 458 P.2d at 718, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 638. See also California v. Krivda,
409 U.S. 33 (1972). Thus it could be argued that though the occupant of a home
consents to the invasion of his privacy by a "gas man," he still has a right to privacy
in regard to the entry of the police.
119. Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 315 (1966) (concurring opinion).
120. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
121. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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lar to that which existed at the time Professor Wilgus concluded
his series of articles on warrantless arrest:
What constitutes police "breaking" seems to be the same as in burglary:
*. . but contrary to the rule in burglary, obtaining admission by
strategem by officer is not a "breaking," if not accompanied by false
1 22
pretense and violent entry.
Entry by fraud or affirmative misrepresentation was held illegal in
Wong Son v. United States12 and Gatewood v. United States. 2 4 In
each case, however, the Court made clear that the illegality arose from

the use of force to enter dwellings after the occupants had partially
21, In Dickopened their doors in response to the misrepresentations.1
2 7
1 26
ey v. United States this rule was accepted in dictum.

The United States Supreme Court has not decided a case where the
fraudulent entry was not accompanied by force. The Sabbath Court
specifically refused to entertain the question: "We do not deal here
with entries obtained by ruse, which have been viewed as involving no
'breaking.' "128 The cases Sabbath cited as expressing this view were
Leahy v. United States 29 which held that misrepresentation of identity to gain admission was not a breaking 80 and Smith v. United
122. Wilgus, supra note 1, at 806 (footnotes omitted). Professor Wilgus' statement
has the authority of his position but little else. The common law cases he cited dealt
with service of civil process. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Holmes, 43 Conn. 528, 529-30
(1876) (civil process of attachment in assumpsit); Rex v. Backhouse, 98 Eng. Rep. 533
(K.B. 1772) (writ for 40 pounds); Waterhouse v. Saltmarsh, 80 Eng. Rep. 409 (K.B.
1724) (serving private process by sheriff); Parke v. Evans, 80 Eng. Rep. 211 (K.B.
1724) (a sheriff cannot lawfully enter a house when the door has been opened by craft
and false pretenses in serving civil process). See note 26 supra.
123. 371 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1963) (narcotics agent procured entry to laundry by
falsely stating he had come for laundry and dry cleaning).
124. 209 F.2d 789, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (officers knocked and announced they were
from Western Union).
125. 371 U.S. at 474; 209 F.2d at 790.
126. 332 F.2d 773 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1964).
127. Id. at 777-78 (officers admitted voluntarily under guise of being repairmen
held permissible since no force employed on officers' part in the opening). Similarly, in
Jones v. United States, 304 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court indicated that an entry procured by fraud followed by force would violate § 3109, but upheld the entry in
question since the fraud had persuaded defendant to open the door. Id. at 384-85. A
similar approach was taken on almost identical facts by the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals in Mullaney v. State, 246 A.2d 291, 298 (1968), and the same result was
reached in Commonwealth v. Riccardi, 283 A.2d 719, 721 (Pa. 1971).
128. 391 U.S. at 590 n.7.
129. 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 945 (1961) (revenue
agents gained admittance by stating they were agents from County Assessor's Office).
130. Id. at 489-90.
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' which held such an entry permissible so long as force was
32
not employed.

Soon after Sabbath, in United States v. Syler, 1 33 the Seventh Circuit
held that the invited entry of Secret Service agents through an open door
after they had announced themselves as "gasmen" did not invalidate
the ensuing arrest and search because it was not a breaking. 134 In the
same year, however, the District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia held a police entry by ruse to be a "breaking" within the definition of section 3109 in Bower v. Coitier.15 There, an agent called
the renter of an apartment on the phone and informed him that there
were FBI agents at the door wishing to talk to him, although the agents'
6
actual intention was to arrest the occupant's guest.'3
87
Similarly, Circuit Judge Tuttle's opinion in United States v. Beale
held federal officers' use of a trick to enter a hotel room, without a
proper announcement, to be an invalid method of entry for the purpose
of arrest. Noting that Sabbath specifically left this question unresolved, 38 he nonetheless concluded that Sabbath required him to rule
that
entry by use of deception, even where force is not involved, is governed by § 3109. Indeed, we can see no meaningful difference between gaining entrance into one's hotel room by pretending there is a
visit by the hotel manager and by using the manager's passkey.' 8 9
However, the court granted a rehearing and retreated from its prior
opinion that the underlying rationale of Sabbath requires entries secured
by deception and without the use of any force to be governed by the
federal announcement statute. 40 The court distinguished Sabbath as
a situation involving some force, however minimal,' 4' and thus con-

cluded that Sabbath left undisturbed the distinction between entry
4
where some force is employed and entry where force is not an element.' 1
Although it found this rule somewhat dubious, the court concluded
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

357 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 488 n.1.
430 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 70.
309 F. Supp. 1064 (S.D.W. Va. 1970).
Id. at 1070.
436 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1971).
See text accompanying note 128 supra.
436 F.2d at 575.
United States v. Beale, 445 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 978.
Id.
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that only the Supreme Court could broaden the breaking concept to
include entry by deception wholly without the use of force. 143
Judge Tuttle dissented vigorously in the face of this retreat from his

earlier opinion:
[W]hat we are dealing with is the right of the government to obtain
entrance into a person's home by the use of fraudulent tale, no matter what the dimensions of the fraud or deceit involved.
If the basic principle is, as I deem it to be, "the reverence of the law
for the individual's right of privacy in his house," then, it seems to me
that we should not hesitate to apply what to me appears to be a clear
and logical extension of the doctrine announced in Sabbath, without
requiring the indigent accused to seek an opportunity to present, by
144
certiorari, his plea to the Supreme Court.

State courts have also generally proven unreceptive to the idea of
holding such entries as breakings.

In State v. Valentine'" and State v.

Darroch46 the Oregon supreme court decided that ruse entries do not
offend privacy considerations.147 In both cases, an undercover agent
posing as a narcotics buyer was present in the defendant's home. The
agent left the home under the guise of going to his car to get money for
the purchase. Other officers then entered through the door he had left
ajar and arrested the defendants.148 In Darroch,the court went so far
as to find that an implied invitation had been extended to the arresting
officers since the occupants were expecting the reentry of the under49
cover agent.'
The California appellate courts confronted by the issue have all but
unanimously concluded that such entries do not constitute a breaking,8 0
143. Id.
144. Id. at 979. Judge Tuttle's reasoning was adopted in United States v. Bradley,
455 F.2d 1181 (1st Cir. 1972). The court indicated that a concern with privacy was
central to section 3109, but found that the prior entry and continued presence of an
undercover agent had sufficiently compromised the occupants' privacy as to vitiate the
impropriety of any subsequent entry. Id. at 1185-86.
145. 504 P.2d 84 (Ore. 1972).
146. 492 P.2d 308 (Ore. 1971).
147. 504 P.2d at 89; 492 P.2d at 310.
148. 504 P.2d at 85; 492 P.2d at 309.
149. 492 P.2d at 310. The Oregon courts also upheld a ruse entry in State v. Monteith, 477 P.2d 244 (Ore. 1970).
150. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Proctor), 5 Cal. App. 3d 109, 114-15, 84
Cal. Rptr. 778, 781-82 (1970) (occupant opened door to minor who was accompanied
by police waiting around comer of building); People v. Ramirez, 4 Cal. App. 3d 154,
157-58, 84 Cal. Rptr. 104, 105-06 (1970) (officer invited in after telling occupant he
wanted to "talk to him"); People v. Coleman, 263 Cal. App. 2d 697, 703, 69 Cal. Rptr.
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but the California supreme court has yet to speak specifically on the
matter. 151 The one deviation from the norm at the California appellate
level has been People v. Mesaris.152 Plainclothes police officers went
to the door and asked to see a Sears repairman who was in the kitchen. 5 '
The court regarded an entry obtained by the police for a purpose
different from their real purpose as a non-consensual entry and therefore subject to the requirements of the announcement statute. 54
A more recent appellate case, however, refused to follow this deviation from precedent. In People v. Veloz, 5 5 a sheriff knocked on the
door and told defendant's wife that he was a carpet salesman sent by
the welfare office to recarpet her home. Immediately upon entering, he
saw the defendant lying asleep in a bed three or four feet from the
door. Two other deputies entered at a prearranged signal, and one
awakened the defendant. 56 The court distinguished the Mesaris facts
on the theory that in Mesaris the police had no probable cause to arrest
prior to their entry. The court proceeded to conclude that the use of
a ruse to gain entry was lawful because the officers had probable cause
57
to arrest the defendant.
But the court in Mesaris specifically refused to rule on the issue of
probable cause.' 58 The Mesaris court believed that ruse entries were
proscribed by California's announcement statute whether or not they
were preceded by probable cause.' 59 Mesaris might be rejected as a
decision out of line with California precedent, but it cannot be distinguished.
It is doubtful that Mesaris signals the inception of a trend to invalidate ruse entries in California. The weight of authority in California
holds that if police officers have probable cause to enter a dwelling, they
910, 914 (1968) (hotel clerk knocked at door in company of police); People v. Quilon,
245 Cal. App. 2d 624, 628, 54 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (1966) (defendant opened door to
parole officer accompanied by narcotics officers); People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal. App. 2d
435, 446, 308 P.2d 821, 827 (1957) (defendant opened a door to narcotics informer
accompanied by police).
151. However, in Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1012 (1970), the court held in a habeas corpus proceeding that California's
announcement protections did not bar ruse entries.
152. 14 Cal. App. 3d 71, 91 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1970).
153. Id. at 73, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
154. Id. at 75, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
155. 22 Cal. App. 3d 499, 99 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1971).
156. Id. at 501, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
157. Id. at 503, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
158. 14 Cal. App. 3d at 76 n.4, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 840 n.4.
159. Id. at 76, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 840.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[VQ1. 7

may employ a ruse to do so.' 60 Presumably, however, California
courts will distinguish between ruses which succeed in gaining an invitation to enter and ruses which only succeed in getting a door open.
The former minimizes the potential for violence; the latter invites the
type of confrontation that announcement statutes were designed to
avoid.
CONCLUSION

The home cannot be a sanctuary in which those suspected of crimes
may find shelter from officers of the law. But when the police do
approach the door of a suspect's home, they have reached an area protected from unreasonable governmental intrusion by the fourth and
fourteenth amendments and by a tradition deeply rooted in our common law heritage as codified in breaking and entering statutes.
The growing emphasis on the protection of privacy and prevention
of violent confrontations as the primary policies underlying announcement statutes has given rise to the apparently unanimous expanding of
the term "breaking" to include those entries by means of a passkey' 6 '
or the opening of a closed but unlocked door. 1 62 The same can be
said for the trend in favor of similarly classifying entries through an already open doorway. 163 The one type of entry, which only a few
courts have chosen to classify as a breaking, has been the ruse entry.' 0 4
Although the decisions are not unmixed, most courts maintain that
ruse entries are acceptable modes of entry under the announcement
statutes.
The courts increasingly have come to recognize that the meaning of
the term "breaking" must be fashioned with an eye to the relevant
policy considerations and that the interpretation of the announcement
statutes cannot be confined by the rules of Webster's Dictionary. Fortunately, the courts have proceeded with the recognition that "linguistic
analysis seldom is adequate when a statute is designed to incorporate
fundamental values and the ongoing development of the common
5
law.,"16
Stanley A. Goldman
160. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
161. See notes 10-17 supra and accompanying text.

162. See notes 18-52 supra and accompanying text.
163. See notes 54-113 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 114-60 supra and accompanying text.
165. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968).

